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Abstract English exhibits a variety of embedded how-clause that, while introduced
by a canonically interrogative item, lacks an intuitive sense of interrogativity. This
paper offers an analysis of the semantics of these clauses that is grounded inter-
rogative semantics. On this view, how in these clauses introduces a degenerate,
necessarily-singleton question set. Further, the paper observes that how here in-
troduces a factive presupposition that cannot be reduced to the matrix predicate’s
entailments. Accordingly, this paper supports a view on which factivity can arise
from multiple sources. A diachronic-based account is also offered to explain the
reccurence of how in non-manner embedded clauses cross-linguistically.
Keywords: factivity, non-manner how-clauses, interrogative, clausal complementation
1 Introduction
An obvious property of interrogatives is that they can occur either in a matrix context
or embedded under a predicate. In this paper, I focus on a type of embedded clause,
headed by how, that breaks this symmetry. How, as a canonical question word, has a
number of different uses:
(1) a. We found out [how Carl was dancing] (namely, clumsily). MANNER
b. We found out [how Allyson spells her name] (namely, first a, then l...).
METHOD
c. We found out [how hot it was yesterday] (namely, 90°). DEGREE
d. We found out [how (in the world) Geoff was still asleep] (namely,
because he didn’t fall asleep until 5am).
PROPOSITIONAL-HOW (Pak 2017)
From these interrogative uses, we can distinguish a fifth type of embedded
how-clause, which I will term a complementizer-like how-clause (CHC); the term
follows Nye (2013). The following examples all have a salient CHC parse:
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(2) a. They told me how the tooth fairy doesn’t really exist. (Legate 2010:1)
≈ they told me that the tooth fairy doesn’t really exist (and she doesn’t!)
b. We talked about how this snowstorm was totally unexpected.
c. It’s funny how people always want what they don’t have.
Each of these sentences has a interrogative-how construal (or perhaps multiple
interrogative construals, with different uses of how). Sentence (2a), for instance, has
a propositional-how construal, on which the interlocutors informed the speaker of
how the world came to be such that there is no tooth fairy in it. However, there is
also another available reading, the CHC reading, on which the speaker was simply
informed of the tooth-fairy’s nonexistence and takes this to be a true fact. This paper
focuses on this latter reading.
Here, I aim to address two main questions. The first concerns the compositional
semantics of English CHCs like (2a). As we will see, CHCs distribute like embedded
interrogatives, but they lack an intuitive sense of interrogativity. The question
thus arises of how to account for their intuitive parallel to non-interrogative that-
clauses but also their formal and distributional parallel to embedded questions. To
explain this pattern, I propose an analysis of CHC semantics on which they denote a
singleton set of propositions, with CHC how additionally adding a presupposition of
the complement’s truth. This analysis formally parallels Uegaki’s (2015) account of
that-clauses (on which those clauses denote singleton sets of propositions).
The second question concerns why, of all wh-items, how is used in CHCs: other
wh-items like who and why do not permit CHC-like interpretations. This question
is particularly salient because non-manner uses of how can be found in multiple















‘Anna saw Berta packing her bag.’











‘I think that he talked to Mary.’ (Roussou 2020:13a)
I propose a largely diachronic explanation for this pattern. In particular, I suggest
that how’s status as an adjunct makes it more salient for reanalysis as originating
within the clause’s left periphery.
1 The semantics of non-manner how-clauses in both Greek and German differs substantially from that
of English CHCs. For clarity, I reserve the term CHC to discuss the English construction and its
semantics, reserving the broader term non-manner how-clause (following Umbach, Hinterwimmer &
Gust (2021)) for analogous constructions in other languages.
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This paper proceeds as follows. §2 presents the data that my account of English
CHC semantics aims to capture; I lay out key generalizations and also discuss
assumptions I make about CHC syntax. From there, §3 presents an analysis of the
semantics of English CHCs and compares this account to a prior account of English
CHCs by Liefke (2021). I turn in §4 to look more broadly at non-manner uses of
how and offer a conjecture as to why how, relative to other wh-items, is more often
used with a non-canonical or non-interrogative function. §5 concludes.
2 Empirical generalizations
This section sets out generalizations regarding the semantics of CHCs that the
analysis will aim to capture. At present, there is a limited amount of work on the
syntax (Legate 2010; Nye 2013; Jarvis to appear) or semantics (Liefke 2021) of
English CHCs.2 In §2.1, I overview assumptions that I make about CHC syntax,
based largely on Legate’s (2010) characterization. In §2.2, I present three core
generalizations about CHC semantics that my analysis is designed to capture.
2.1 Syntactic assumptions
This account relies upon two assumptions about the syntax of CHCs. The first
concerns their category: CHCs are syntactically DPs. The second concerns the
location of CHC how: it is base-generated in the left periphery and does not move
from within the clause. In this section, I briefly overview evidence for both of these
claims.
2.1.1 Category: CHCs are DPs
Most work on CHC syntax (Legate 2010; Jarvis to appear, pace Nye 2013) treats
CHCs as DPs. This characterization largely relies on distributional differences
between that-clauses and CHCs. For instance, Legate notes that CHCs cannot occur
in positions that are not assigned Case:
(5) It was conceded {that/*how/*[the fact that]} the tooth fairy doesn’t exist.
(Legate 2010:7)
Here, we see that CHCs appear to require Case, while that-clauses do not. Legate
takes this as evidence of a syntactic-category distinction between the two, with CHCs
behaving like Case-requiring DPs.
2 Umbach et al. (2021) also offers a characterization of the semantics of German non-manner how-
clauses, an analogue of CHCs with different properties and distribution. See §3.2.4 for some
differences between English and German non-manner how-clauses.
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Similar evidence comes from predicates that can take either PP or that-clause
complements. Here, CHCs can occur under the PP, while that-clauses cannot:
(6) They told me about {*that/how/[the fact that]} the tooth fairy doesn’t exist.
(Legate 2010:2)
Again, we see CHCs patterning with true DPs rather than that-clauses. Based on
evidence like this, Legate (2010) concludes that CHCs are syntactically DPs. (See
her work and Jarvis (to appear) for more arguments.)
2.1.2 Location: No movement
A second assumption is that CHC how is base-generated in its surface location in the
left periphery of the clause. Umbach et al. (2021), following the characterization of
English by Legate (2010), show extensively that wie ‘how’ in German non-manner
how-clauses does not leave behind a gap; analogous argumentation also applies to
English.
Their argument relies upon the well-established fact that the trace of a moving
item occupies a syntactic position which cannot be simultaneously filled by another
item (Chomsky 1981). For instance, in a manner-how question, the trace left by how
prevents us from including another manner adverbial in the question:
(7) * Howmanner did you dance gracefully?
If CHC how moves from within the clause, we would expect it to leave behind a gap,
just as in the manner question above. However, we can find no such evidence:
(8) a. They told me how (they don’t think) you worded the letter properly.
MANNER (Legate 2010:26)
b. We talked about how Mary won the prize by taking one small step at a
time. METHOD
c. We talked about how it was 90 degrees out yesterday. DEGREE
d. We talked about how John’s still sleeping because he didn’t get to sleep
until 6am. PROPOSITIONAL-HOW
As Legate concludes, CHCs are “semantically complete” (p.130): minimally, CHC
how does not leave behind a trace that corresponds to any interrogative use listed
in (1) above. Based on this and other evidence, Legate concludes that CHC how is
base-generated in its surface location in the left periphery.
The exact location that CHC how occupies (whether the C head or Spec,CP)
has been debated (Legate 2010; Nye 2013), and it is not crucial for our composi-
tional account. Specifier-to-head reanalysis is a common pattern in the CP domain
(Gelderen 2008), and it is not relevant to us exactly which left-peripheral position




With this background, I now turn to a set of three semantic generalizations that
my account aims to capture: that CHCs are factive in interpretation, that they
distribute like (a subtype of) embedded interrogatives, and that they are intuitively
non-interrogative. I lay out each generalization in turn.
2.2.1 Factivity
A first generalization, implicit in the paraphrase given in (2a) earlier, is that CHCs are
factive in interpretation. Legate (2010) asserts that CHCs involve a truth presupposi-
tion, and Nye (2013) and Liefke (2021) also assume a similar presupposition. Evi-
dence for this point comes from the observation that CHCs are factively-interpreted
even when embedded under predicates that otherwise do not require their comple-
ments to be true.
This can be seen with predicates like tell and agree (on), both of which can
embed declaratives, interrogatives, and CHCs. Declarative complements to both
predicates are non-veridical:
(9) a. They told me that the tooth fairy doesn’t exist (but I don’t believe it).
b. The children agreed that Santa really exists.
Interrogative complements to these predicates, too, are non-veridical. (See Tso-
hatzidis (1993) and Spector & Egré (2015) with regard to tell.) That is, the agent
need not stand in relation to the true answer to the embedded question, as can be
seen in the following examples:
(10) a. Every day, the meteorologists tell the population where it will rain the
following day, but they are often wrong. (Spector & Egré 2015:20)
b. The children all agreed on whether Santa really exists. They all think he
exists, even though that isn’t true.
These predicates thus do not generally introduce a factive presupposition (or any
veridical inference).
However, CHCs under these predicates still are factively interpreted. Legate
notes that CHCs under tell cannot be questioned or denied by the speaker; (9a) is
coherent, but (11) is not.
(11) They told me how the tooth fairy doesn’t exist (#but I don’t believe it).
(Legate 2010:15)
A similar pattern holds for agree on, which can embed CHCs (12a). A CHC with a




(12) a. The children agreed on how they’d had a great vacation.
b. # The children agreed on how Santa really exists.
These patterns suggest that the inference of truth in CHCs cannot be reduced to the
presupposition-inducing behavior of matrix predicates.
A seeming counterexample to the factivity of CHCs comes from highly quotative
contexts with communication predicates:
(13) a. The point for your average voter is that if they see the EDL marching
through their streets shouting about... how the UK is going to be Islami-
fied by 2040, they are also receiving these cues from other sections of
British society. (Nye 2013:53)
b. My uncle keeps telling me about increasingly ridiculous conspiracy the-
ories. Last week, he told me all about how squirrels have microphones
in their tails now, which was a new one!
In examples like these (which are most naturally accompanied in speech by exag-
gerated and highly marked prosodic contours), the speaker clearly does not endorse
the content of the CHC or presuppose its truth. Accordingly, these examples provide
a clear challenge to the factivity generalization.
However, we can note that in other, similarly highly-quotative contexts, other
sentence types—notably including exclamatives—can also lack an inference of
factivity:
(14) My uncle went on and on about what a scam tofu is.
Exclamatives, similarly to CHCs, are often analyzed as factive (Zanuttini & Portner
2003). Accordingly, it seems that the most likely explanation for these patterns
is that the loss of factivity observed in examples like (13a) is more a property of
quotation than of CHCs per se.4 I will thus maintain the generalization that CHCs
are factive, and the account developed below will incorporate a truth presupposition.
3 I thank Ivano Caponigro for discussion of this point and Emily Clem for the examples in (9b) and
(12b).
4 Formalizing this is an avenue for future work, but one possible explanation is that a silent supposedly-
like operator takes scope over the CHC content. Such a move is motivated by the observation that
adding overt supposed(ly) would yield appropriately-factive sentences in these contexts:
(i) a. My uncle told me (about) [how squirrels supposedly have microphones in their tails].
b. My uncle told me (about) [what a supposed scam tofu is].
Though other avenues are certainly possible, it seems clear that these examples are not patterning
like Free Indirect Discourse (Sharvit 2008; Eckardt 2014). In FID, indexicals like today in (2a) can




Our third generalization, following Nye (2013), is that CHCs only occur as com-
plements of responsive predicates. Following Lahiri (2002), we can partition
interrogative-embedding complements into two groups: rogative predicates like
wonder and ask require an agent to stand in relation to a full semantic question,
while responsive predicates like know, tell, and be certain place an agent in relation
to an answer to a question. Nye’s (2013) corpus work suggests that CHCs occur
under the latter set of predicates.
Specifically, on Nye’s characterization, CHCs can be embedded under cognitive
factives, emotive factives, and communication verbs. Examples of each of the
following are shown below:
(15) a. Cognitive factive (e.g., remember):
I remembered how I’d never won a single race in elementary school.
b. Emotive factive (e.g., funny):
It’s funny how people always want what they don’t have.
c. Communication verb (e.g., tell):
She told me how she couldn’t stand her new neighbor.
Nye’s work is restricted to predicates that directly select for CHC, wh-, and that-
clause complements, with no extra prepositions involved for any type of complement.
The true range of predicates that can embed CHCs is in fact somewhat broader. As
observed earlier, other responsive predicates like agree (on) can also embed CHCs.
While such predicates fall outside of Nye’s purview because agree does not take a
preposition when embedding a that-clause, Nye’s generalization appears to extend
to such cases.
By contrast, CHCs cannot be embedded under rogative predicates:
(16) * They asked/wondered howCHC the tooth fairy doesn’t exist.
Though an interrogative parse of the embedded clause is available (as expected), a
CHC construal is unavailable. A fully satisfactory account should explain why this
is the case.
Further, we can observe that CHCs cannot be embedded under predicates like
believe that are traditionally analyzed as uninterrogative (Lahiri 2002):
(ii) a. John looked at my picture. [Yes, he thought, he wanted to marry me today (≡ that day).]
(Sharvit 2008:4)
b. When I talked to my friend two weeks ago, he told me all about how he had way too
much work to do that day (6≡ today).
This contrast suggests that, however one might analyze the loss of factivity in quotative CHC contexts,
it cannot be ascribed to a wholly FID-like semantics.
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(17) * Susan believes how the tooth fairy doesn’t exist.
Thus, it is clear that CHCs do not fully distribute like that-clauses. Instead, we
maintain the generalization that they are restricted to responsive predicates.
2.2.3 Non-interrogativity
In our initial description of the CHC reading, we saw that the CHC reading is distinct
from the canonical interrogative uses of how. While how-containing embedded
clauses always have an interrogative reading, this reading can be distinguished from
the CHC one. When an agent stands in relation to an embedded question under a
responsive predicate (x Vs Q), she stands in relation to an answer to that question and
thus also stands in relation to a proposition p that contains some additional element
(e.g., manner/method/reason) not contained in the surface form of Q. By contrast,
the agent with a CHC need not be concerned about any such additional element (as
in the earlier discussion of (2a).
The CHC reading, though it contains how, thus lacks the intuitive interroga-
tive flavor of interrogative how. The account will aim to explain how and why
a canonically interrogative item like how is used in this non-interrogative way in
CHCs.
3 CHCs as answers
In this section, I develop an account that captures our three empirical generalizations.
To begin, we will consider one salient hypothesis that straightforwardly accounts for
the factivity of CHCs: namely, we assume that CHC how is semantically identical to
a factive complementizer.
3.1 Hypothesis: CHCs as factive that-clauses
One popular enterprise aims to reduce the presuppositional behavior of embedded
interrogatives to that of embedded declaratives. In this vein, Spector & Egré (2015)
argue that interrogatives embedded under a responsive predicate P are veridically
interpreted if and only if declarative complements of P are veridically/factively
interpreted. On such a view, the declarative complementizer that is semantically
vacuous, and any presuppositional behavior of the complement results from the
choice of embedding predicate.
However, there is reason to think that complementizers may play a more active
role than they do on this view. Evidence for this comes from languages like Greek
with richer complementizer systems. In Greek, one complementizer, pu, has been
traditionally analyzed as factive (Christidis 1982) and contrasts with a different
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complementizer oti. Both complementizers can occur under the predicate thimame























































‘I remember meeting him in Paris – however I may be wrong.’5
(Roussou 1992:9b)
Here, the truth of the oti-headed clause can be questioned by the speaker, while the
truth of the pu-clause cannot be. While the precise characterization of the distinction
between oti and pu has been a matter of continuing debate (for an overview, see
Angelopoulos 2019), it seems clear that we must ascribe some additional com-
ponent of meaning to some but not other declarative complements. That is, the
presuppositional behavior of a Greek complement is not entirely predictable from
the embedding predicate.
A common way to account for this is to ascribe presuppositional behavior onto a
complementizer itself; there are many implementations of such a system that propose
a distinct factive complementizer thatF (Chierchia 1984, 2019; Kratzer 2006, i.a.).
For the present purposes, the exact implementation is not crucial. At a broad level,
we can imagine giving CHC how the same denotation as thatF . Indeed, Liefke
(2021) suggests an analysis on which how in some6 CHCs has the same semantics
as Kratzer’s thatF :
(19) 〚howCHC〛i = 〚thatF〛i = λ p : pi.[λ j : p j∧ (∀k(pk∧ k ≤ j)→ k = j)]
On this account CHC how takes in a proposition p, imposes the presupposition that
p holds in the evaluation situation i, and returns a set of p’s minimal exemplifiers.
Such an account, by design, can capture the factivity of CHCs, but it offers little
explanation of the observed distribution of CHCs. In particular, it is not entirely
clear why CHCs should occur under non-factive predicates like tell and agree on.
5 Roussou marks this example with the symbol !.
6 Liefke offers a two-part characterization of English CHCs on which some are denotationally equiv-
alent to factive that-clauses and others are events-in-progress (the latter of which follows Umbach
et al.’s (2021) account of German non-manner how-clauses).
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These predicates usually would not select for thatF -headed clauses, so it is difficult
to explain why they should be able to select CHCs. To explain the distributional
behavior, such an account requires a certain degree of selection by fiat.
For this reason, I will reject the proposal of directly adopting a ready-made
factive complementizer’s semantics for the semantics of CHC how. Our goal, in a
way, will be to construct a different sort of factive-complementizer-like denotation,
but one that can account for the interrogative-like distribution of CHCs. To do this, I
propose taking interrogative semantics as the basis for a semantics of CHCs.
3.2 CHCs as “deficient” questions
In this account, I will rely on the standard assumption (Hamblin 1973; Karttunen
1977) that a question and proposition have different types. Specifically, I treat a
proposition as type 〈s, t〉, while a question is an 〈〈s, t〉, t〉 set of propositions. I will
leverage this type difference to explain restrictions on the distribution of CHCs.
At this point, we face a choice point regarding our assumptions of how embedded
questions serve as arguments to responsive predicates. There are two salient possi-
bilities: either directly (with the matrix predicate semantically taking an 〈〈s, t〉, t〉
object), or with the relation between the two mediated by an answerhood operator.
The former strategy involves postulating interrogative-taking variants of matrix
predicates and has recently been advanced by Spector & Egré (2015) and Uegaki
(2020), among others, while the latter has a long history including Heim (1994)
and Dayal (1994). At its core, this account can be made compatible with either
approach. However, the former strategy offers a slightly more explanatory view
of the distributional patterns of CHCs. To see this, we will briefly consider the
answerhood-operator strategy.
3.2.1 CHCs and answerhood operators
On this view, answerhood operators mediate the relationship between an interrogative
complement and its embedding predicate. We take Dayal’s (2016) ANS-D as an
example of such an operator:
(20) JANS-D(Q)K = λw.ι p[pw∧ p ∈ Q∧∀p′[[p′w∧ p′ ∈ Q]→ p⊆ p′]]
This operator applies to a 〈〈s, t〉, t〉 set Q and a world w and returns the maximal true
answer p in Q. Accordingly, it returns a proposition that is necessarily true in w.
In this framework, we can treat CHC how as Partee’s (1987) IDENT type-shifter,
shifting its complement from a proposition into the set that contains it:
(21) 〚howCHC〛= λ p〈s,t〉.λq〈s,t〉.p = q
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Then, we can use the ANS-D operator to type-shift from an interrogative type back to
a propositional one. In this process, the ANS-D operator allows for the introduction
of a truth presupposition of the CHC complement p in world w (since p is the only
element in {p}, the presupposition of ANS-D cannot be satisfied if p is not true in
w). Hence, we derive the factivity of CHCs.
Such a move, however, crucially relies upon the identification of the world w
with the evaluation world w0. However, this is not generally the case: under non-
veridical predicates like agree on, for instance, ANS-D applied to an interrogative
complement should not necessarily yield a proposition that is true in the evaluation
world. To account for the factivity of CHCs under agree on, then, we must assume
that CHCs always associate with a factivity-introducing ANS operator, even though
predicates like agree on would not normally select for or require this sort of operator.
This reduces the explanatory power of this account. By contrast, the direct approach
does not require this sort of maneuver.
3.2.2 CHCs and the direct approach
As we turn now to the direct account, we will begin with a similar approach to
the previous section. In particular, one benefit of the denotation of CHC how
given in (21) is that it captures the non-interrogativity of CHCs. Conventionally,
an interrogative consists of a set of propositions, each of which corresponds to an
answer to the question. Treating CHCs as singleton sets as in (21) thus gives them
an interrogative type, but does not add additional interrogative-associated material.7
This in itself, however, is insufficient to capture the meaning of a CHC. In
particular, it cannot capture the factivity of CHCs. This is because we cannot reduce
the factivity of CHCs entirely to the entailments introduced by matrix predicates.
On the direct approach, there is no additional ANS-like operator to incorporate
factivity of CHCs with predicates like agree on. Accordingly, we will incorporate an
additional presupposition of factivity into the meaning of CHC how. In particular, I
will take this as a precondition on constructing the set containing the complement:
(22) 〚howCHC〛w0 := λ p〈s,t〉 : pw0.{p}
This introduces a presupposition of the complement’s truth in the evaluation world.
In a way, then, we have constructed effectively a factive complementizer with
a non-standard type. This allows us to address restrictions on the distribution of
CHCs. For one, we can capture the fact that CHCs cannot occur under rogative
7 Note that in a standard Karttunen approach to interrogative semantics, type-shifting in this way is
the contribution of the [+Q] C head. If one assumes that CHC how syntactically occupies a specifier
position, it would be possible to separate this meaning contribution out from how itself (which might
then just introduce a truth presupposition, as below).
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predicates. This can be explained by Uegaki’s (2015) non-triviality presupposition
for rogatives:8
(23) 〚wonder/ask/inquire〛w(Q)(x) is defined only if x can believe both of the
following: (Uegaki 2015:45)
a. λw.∃p ∈ Q[p(w) = 1] (there is a true proposition in Q)
b. λw.∃p ∈ Q[p(w) = 0] (there is a false proposition in Q)
Since CHCs are necessarily-singleton sets, a coherent speaker cannot believe that
the single proposition p in {p} is simultaneously true and false. Thus, CHCs cannot
occur under rogative predicates.
Further, we can capture the fact that CHCs cannot occur under anti-rogative
predicates like believe. This is readily captured by the question-like semantic type of
CHCs, on the assumption that believe necessarily selects only for 〈s, t〉 propositions.
3.2.3 Matrix predicate contributions
This account presents a fairly minimial view of CHC semantics, where they only
presuppose the truth of their complement and lift the complement’s type. However,
some prior work (especially Nye (2013)) argues for a stronger semantics for CHCs.
Her evidence comes from sentences like the following:
(24) A note on a bathroom door in the Chicago headquarters warned workers to
remember [how/#that – when they were on a high after winning the Iowa
caucuses – Hillary Clinton had shocked them with a primary victory].
(Nye 2013: 76-77, Nye’s judgment)
Here, Nye argues that the CHCs “convey something additional to the basic fact of a
factive that-clause complement” (p.176-177). This raises the question of whether we
need to encode more in the semantics of CHC how. I will suggest here that we do
not, and that we can instead ascribe this behavior to properties of individual matrix
predicates.
8 This formulation of the presupposition requires an account of polar questions on which such questions
denote a multimembered set, in contrast to singleton-set approaches like that of Biezma & Rawlins
(2012). The account of CHCs developed here also, at least at this point, appears similarly to require a
multimembered approach to polar questions in order to capture the different between know howCHC
p and know whether p. The notion of highlighting in polar questions (Roelofsen & Farkas 2015) may
offer a way to bridge these analyses, though I leave a full discussion of this to future work. Note that
CHCs and polar questions presumably differ in whether they presuppose truth within the complement
clause (as with CHCs) or not, but know later imposes a veridicality requirement with interrogative
complements that is trivial for CHCs.
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For the English speakers that I have consulted, the contrast that Nye reports in
(24) is not especially clear-cut. However, a main location where CHCs and that-
clauses diverge in interpretation is in rising declaratives with know and remember:
(25) You know that I went to Rome last year? (Who told you?!/#Well, later I...)
(26) You know howCHC I went to Rome last year? (Well, later I.../#Who told
you?!)
Here, the rising declarative with the that-clause expresses the speaker’s surprise
about the addressee’s knowledge. By contrast, the variant with the CHC does not.
Instead, it functions as a topic-raiser, perhaps to begin some larger story.
This pattern seems to be restricted to know and remember. Given this, it seems
most promising to assume that the difference in meaning here relates to the meaning
of these matrix predicates, not to CHCs themselves. In particular, it has long been
observed that at least know is sensitive to the distinction between DPs and CPs, which
more or less maps on to the distinction between familiarity and factual knowledge;
some languages, like French and German, realize this type of difference overtly
(King 2002; Moltmann 2013, i.a.). Since CHCs have been argued to be syntactic
DPs (Legate 2010), it seems reasonable that the differences we observe in (25)
and (26) result from the differing syntactic categories of CHCs and that-clauses:
CHCs are selected by the DP-taking, familiarity-denoting variant of know, while
that-clauses are selected by the CP-taking variant. Because the two variants of know
are different lexical items, we no longer expect CHC and that-clause complements
to pattern together; namely, DP-selecting know can check whether the agent the
agent is familiar with the CHC complement, rather than whether she has factual
knowledge of it’s truth. On this account, we can attribute the contrast observed here,
and also in (24), to the contributions of different matrix predicates and do not need
to encode it in the meaning of a CHC.9
3.2.4 Comparisons to previous accounts
Liefke (2021) offers the only other existing account of the semantics of English
CHCs. The present account, though it shares several general notions with her account
(both accounts ascribe a semantics resembling a factive complement to at least some
CHCs), offers a few advantages.
For one, the present account offers a more explanatory view of which matrix
predicates can embed CHCs. As mentioned earlier, Liefke suggests that English
9 Such an analysis would require the familiarity denotation of know to be sensitive only to syntactic
category and to be flexible in terms of semantic type, and it would also require an explanation of




CHCs come in two varieties. One of these varieties of CHC how carries the denota-
tion of Kratzer’s (2006) minimal-situation thatF . This account does not explain why
predicates like tell and agree (on) that usually do not take factive complements can
embed CHCs.
On her account, the other variety of CHC denotes an event-in-progress. This
variety of CHC has the same denotation as Umbach et al. (2021) give to German
non-manner how-clauses. Accordingly, her account predicts that matrix predicates
that license German non-manner how-clauses should also license CHCs.
However, this is not the case. German non-manner how-clauses are licensed





























‘He woke up laughing because he dreamed that he had told a joke.’
(Umbach et al. 2021:f.n. 5a)
Here, the joke-telling occurred only in the dream world, not in the real one. This
contrasts with the behavior of CHCs in English:10
(28) # He dreamed about how a unicorn was prancing in the sun.
In contrast to (27), this CHC is infelicitous if the unicorn existed only in the dream.
Accordingly, Liefke’s account additionally overgenerates regarding which English
CHCs are licensed.
4 Why how?
The account developed here treats CHC how as retaining some core properties of
an interrogative—namely, generating an 〈〈s, t〉, t〉 set of propositions—while, unlike
standard interrogative items, introducing a necessarily singleton-set (and a factive
presupposition). The account accordingly assumes lexical ambiguity between an
interrogative variant (or variants) of how and the CHC one. A natural question, then,
is why CHCs use how: why do other English wh-items like who or what not give
rise the same sort of ambiguity?
This question is also made more salient by the observation that, as we saw earlier,
we can find non-interrogative how-headed embedded clauses in a number of other
languages. Examples of such clauses in German and Greek, as seen earlier in (3)-(4).
10 This example parallels an example that Liefke offers with the predicate imagine; I find both the
imagine and dream sentences similarly infelicitous.
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The question of why how recurs with this sort of non-interrogative usage naturally
arises.
4.1 CHCs as products of reanalysis
I propose a largely diachronic explanation of this phenomenon. On such an account,
CHC and other non-interrogative uses of how rely on the reanalysis of the wh-item
as originating within the left periphery of the clause rather than moving into it. Such
reanalysis, I suggest, is especially available to how because of two factors. First,
CHC how is an adjunct; and second, it has a broad range of interrogative uses. Both
of these, I suggest, make how more likely than other wh-items to be reanalyzed.
Because how is an adjunct wh-item, the surface string that follows it in an
embedded question is grammatical on its own. In this way it contrasts with argument
wh-items, as shown below:
(29) a. ... who [TP Mary thanked]
b. ... how [TP Mary danced]
c. ... that [TP Mary danced]
The predicate thank is necessarily transitive, so an object-less sentence like *Mary
thanked is ungrammatical. Accordingly, forming a grammatical parse of the brack-
eted TP in (29a) requires recognizing an object gap corresponding to movement of
who. In contrast, because how is an adjunct, the bracketed portion of (29b), Mary
danced, is grammatical as is. (To interpret the embedded question, we must recog-
nize that wh-movement has occurred, but this does not impact the grammaticality
of the TP on its own.) In this way, how resembles other items like that (29c) that
are base-generated within the CP, since they similarly embed fully grammatical
TPs. This parallel, I suggest, makes how more available to reanalysis than argument
wh-items like who.
A parallel, semantically-oriented argument centers on Simons, Beaver, Roberts
& Tonhauser’s (2017) notion of question entailments. On this view, a proposition
is entailed by a question if it is entailed by every member of the question’s Ham-
blin/Karttunen (H/K) set. Again by virtue of how’s being an adjunct, the question
how p? entails the gapless proposition p: in a question like How did Mary dance?,
every element of the H/K set {that Mary danced gracefully, that Mary danced slowly,
...} entails that Mary danced in some manner and, consequently, that Mary danced.
By contrast, with an argument wh-question like Who danced?, there is no way to
treat danced as a proposition in the same way.
A second facet that, I suggest, also plays a role in how’s widespread use in
non-interrogative constructions is the fact that interrogative how already has a wide
number of uses. Especially because of propositional-how uses, any proposition p can
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be questioned with how. This contrasts with some other adjunct wh-items like where
and when, which are mostly restricted to enquiring about events. This, I suggest,
makes how especially prone to reanalysis as a complementizer-like element, due
to its higher frequency and more general distribution (making it perhaps a sort of
default).
4.2 Predictions
A diachronic account of CHCs makes two predictions. First, non-manner how-
clauses should not occur in all languages, since how might undergo reanalysis in
some but not all languages. Second, it raises the possibility that other wh-items
besides how could also be reanalyzed in a similar way, because the semantics of
interrogative how does not directly give rise to the CHC reading. I argue that both of
these predictions are borne out.
4.2.1 Languages without CHCs
First, though we have noted that other languages do have non-manner how-clauses,
this is not universal. For instance, Chinese (Nye 2013), Hindi (Rajesh Bhatt, p.c.),
and Thai (Peter Jenks, p.c.) all lack non-interrogative how-headed embedded clauses
of this sort. This is consistent with a diachronic, reanalysis-based account of CHCs
(and, potentially, other non-manner how-clauses), since whether reanalysis occurs is
a language-particular fact.
Based on this very small sample of languages, we can conjecture that a parameter
that may be relevant to whether a language has non-manner how-clauses is whether
embedded questions in the language involve obligatory wh-movement. All three of
these languages are wh-in-situ languages, though Hindi allows for some scrambling
of wh-items (Bhatt & Dayal 2007). If such a pattern holds up more broadly, it would
lend further support to a reanalysis-based account: how should only be reanalyzed
as originating in an embedded clause’s left periphery if it is seen to surface in that
position. A total lack of wh-movement would serve as counterevidence against
treating how as base-generated within the left periphery.
4.2.2 Eventive when-clauses
Second, a diachronic account predicts that other wh-items may be reanalyzed in a
similar fashion in the history of some languages. This, too, I argue, may be borne
out. Here, I turn to a type of embedded when-clause that Hall & Caponigro (2010)
term an eventive when-clause:
(30) I really hated [when John lied like that]. (Hall & Caponigro 2010:17)
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This sentence has a reading on which the speaker hated the event of John’s lying.
This contrasts with the expective interrogative reading, on which the speaker hated
that John lied at the particular time (say, 2pm) that he did.
Hall and Caponigro analyze these clauses as free relatives on events, with when
originating within the clause within a silent PP and moving into the left periphery,
leaving behind a broadly type-e trace. On this account, when is lexically ambiguous.
It always modifies a type-〈e, t〉 predicate and can restrict it either to times (for
temporal when-clauses) or events:
(31) a. 〚when1〛 = λPλx[P(x)∧ time(x)]
b. 〚when2〛 = λPλx[P(x)∧ event(x)]
A later δ operator applies the ι type-shifter to extract the unique relevant time/event.
Like CHCs, eventive when-clauses lack the standard interrogativity of an em-
bedded clause. However, I have not pursued a free-relative based analysis of CHCs.
This was largely to capture the interrogative-like distribution of CHCs. A further
reason for such an approach was because CHCs are gapless. By contrast, an accout
like Hall & Caponigro’s (2010) would predict gaps within this type of clause.
In fact, eventive when-clauses may be more parallel to CHCs than Hall &
Caponigro’s (2010) account predicts. In particular, we can observe that eventive
when-clauses, too, are gapless. Temporal when-clauses, certainly, are not:
(32) * I read [when you recommended at 5pm]. (Hall & Caponigro 2010:23)
This sentence is ungrammatical if 5pm was the recommended time for reading. This
is strong evidence for when moving and leaving behind a temporal trace.
Eventive when-clauses, by contrast, behave somewhat differently. Here, analo-
gously to the arguments that we saw in (8) for CHCs, we see that we can insert an
extra temporal argument:
(33) Remember [when I accidentally celebrated at 11pm last New Years Eve]?
This suggests that, if eventive when-clauses do have a gap, it is certainly not a
temporal one (though, to be clear, it remains possible that there may be a gap of a
different sort). Perhaps, then, we cannot fully unify temporal and eventive when-
clauses as in Hall and Caponigro’s approach. By contrast, if eventive when-clauses
are gapless, they more closely resemble CHCs.
At this point, it is tempting to see eventive when-clauses as somewhat parallel to
CHCs, but with a different interrogative item. Certainly, this parallelism only extends
so far, as the two are not semantically equivalent. Eventive when-clauses require their
complement to denote an event. Eventive when-clauses with non-event-denoting
embedded clauses are deviant:
(34) ?? I hated [when the tooth fairy didn’t exist].
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This sentence suggests a highly marked context in which the tooth fairy flitted in
and out of non-existence, and her period of non-existence was hated by the speaker.
This amounts to coercion of nonexistence into an event. Eventive when-clauses are
thus more restricted with respect to what their complements can denote than English
CHCs are.
A similar restriction to events has been previously noted for some languages’
non-manner how-clauses. In particular, Umbach et al. (2021) characterize German
non-manner how-clauses as having the same restriction. Nonexistence sentences are



















‘They told me that the tooth fairy doesn’t really exist.’ (Liefke 2021:2b)
Accordingly, the restriction that we see on eventive when-clauses parallel one that is
known to be relevant in non-manner how-clauses. While a full analysis of eventive
when-clauses and of the typology of non-manner how-clauses is beyond the scope
of the present work, it seems not impossible that eventive when-clauses might offer
a parallel to CHCs with a different reanalyzed wh-item. This would lend further
support to a reanalysis-based account of CHC how.
5 Conclusion
This paper has investigated the semantics of CHCs, a type of embedded how-clause.
To explain the distribution and factive presupposition of CHCs, I have proposed an
account on which CHCs occupy an intermediate position between interrogatives
and standard that-clauses: CHCs have the type of a question but, unlike ordinary
questions, do not denote a standardly multimembered set. I also offered a potential
explanation, grounded in diachronic reanalysis, for why we see how used in CHCs.
At its core, the account presented here suggests that factivity does not arise in a
single way across all varieties of complement clauses. In some cases, factivity may
arise from the embedding predicate (as is assumed by e.g. Spector & Egré (2015)).
CHCs, in contrast, provide evidence against treating all factive inferences as arising
in this way. Instead, CHCs serve as an example in which factivity must arise from
the complement itself.
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